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ABSTRACT 
 
Greater attention is being paid to the issue of shareholder rights and corporate governance, 
particularly since the scandals of 1990s and 2000s and the stock market decline of the new 
millennium.  This study advances the concept of an optimum level of shareholder rights in 
corporate governance and analyzes the long-run trends in shareholder rights versus management 
entrenchment, using the G-Index.  This study finds that the level of shareholder rights generally 
has not increased, despite the legislative and regulatory reforms of the 2000s and contrary to the 
general perception.  Rather, shareholder rights have declined amongst the large, S&P 500 
companies.  The paper also finds that there has been a tendency on the part of firms to converge 
to a median-level/norm of shareholder rights.  Evidence further suggests that firms are searching 
for an optimum level that balances the risks and rewards of greater shareholder rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
here has been greater awareness of the importance of corporate governance amongst academicians, 
investors, money managers, governmental institutions, regulatory and professional bodies, lawyers 
and investment bankers, in the recent past.  As a result, greater attention is being paid to developing 
processes for measuring, monitoring, and quantitatively assessing the corporate governance of firms.  Part of the 
impetus for this greater attention and awareness to measuring corporate governance is attributable to the financial 
scandals of the 1990s and 2000s and subsequent exposure by the media.  These scandals revealed a lack of 
monitoring by corporate boards, and by regulatory bodies and the financial markets.  The sharp downturn in the 
stock markets in the early 21
st
 century provided further impetus for reform in corporate governance. 
 
THE U.S. PUBLIC CORPORATION – AN IDEAL 
 
Recent reform efforts in the legislative and regulatory arenas have attempted to rationalize the corporate 
governance ideal in the US.  This ideal embodies the concept that the stockholders own the corporation (Bebchuk, 
2006).  As a result, they are entitled to share in the profits and future direction of the company through their voting 
rights.  Shareholders elect the Board of Directors which is responsible for appointing senior management (the C-
suite).  The management becomes the agent of stockholders and is charged with maximizing shareholder wealth.  It 
is generally believed that greater shareholder rights are associated with better corporate governance and 
consequently greater efforts by management to enhance shareholder wealth. In the parlance of finance literature, 
agency costs are reduced.  
 
It is generally accepted that there are four standards of shareholder-oriented corporate governance.  The 
first standard is associated with Board independence and performance.   In particular, this standard embodies the 
notions that a substantial number of Board members should be independent of the management, and the Audit and 
Compensation Committees should be comprised of independent members, with financial expertise on the Audit 
Committee.  Moreover, management decision processes should be transparent and fully disclosed to the Board for 
evaluation. 
T 
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The second standard prescribes equal voting rights for all shareholders, with an absence of dual/multi- 
classes amongst shareholders.  Shareholder Rights should not be abridged by takeover defenses, unequal voting 
rights, or restrictions on changing by-laws and adding shareholder proposals.  The shareholders should have the 
right to elect the full Board each year, without the limitation of staggered terms for Board members.  The 
shareholders should have the right to an independent nominating committee.  Essentially, the second standard 
implies that the firm’s management is not entrenched and can be replaced by the shareholder-elected Board.  
Furthermore, there are very few restrictions on the rights of shareholders to sell the firm to acquirers.  
 
The third standard of greater shareholder-oriented corporate governance emphasizes transparency of 
financial information and effectiveness of internal controls.  Shareholders should have the right to select auditors, 
and they can be rotated periodically.  The fourth and final standard of shareholder rights ensures that there is an 
independent committee for determining management compensation, and that compensation is based on performance. 
 
Recent legislation and regulations, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SARBOX), and NYSE 
regulations, have addressed these four standards, mandating new practices such as required certification of financial 
statements by the CEO and CFO, disclosure of off balance sheet transactions, Board review of financial controls, 
regular Board meetings without the presence of management, required shareholder approval of all equity-based 
compensation, and other similar measures.   These changes are thought to have improved the quality of corporate 
governance by increasing shareholder rights and facilitating the maximization of shareholder wealth, in accordance 
with the ideal view of corporate governance. 
 
This paper examines the importance of shareholder rights in determining the value of the firm.  In addition, 
it investigates long-run trends in the aggregate measure of shareholders rights in the US over the period 1990 – 
2006, for a large number of publicly-held firms.  The study also examines the trends in corporate governance for 
firms categorized by industry sector and by size of market capitalization. 
 
A THEORY OF OPTIMUM SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 
 
It is generally asserted in the literature that greater shareholder rights ensure a higher value of the firm.  
There are several reasons for this hypothesis.  In the first place, litigation costs may be reduced.  Greater 
transparency of governance processes and financial information for investors and acquirers, and protection of 
minority shareholder rights, may result in less litigation.  Secondly, agency costs may be minimized, as independent 
boards can effectively monitor and supervise management.  In addition, appropriate incentives may be put in place 
which to the performance of management.  Thirdly, greater shareholder-oriented corporate governance may be taken 
as a positive signal for potential investors and analysts.  Fourthly, greater transparency may elevate credit ratings, 
resulting in a lower cost of debt (Ashbaugh-Staife, Collins and LaFonde 2006).  Empirical literature demonstrates 
that greater shareholder rights generally create higher share prices, higher growth rates, higher profitably and lower 
volatility in share prices (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2004; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003; Deutsche Bank, 
2004).  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Ashbaugh-Staiffe, Collins and LaFonde (2004) also find that cost of 
equity capital is lower for firms with greater shareholder rights. 
 
On the other hand, it should be emphasized but is often overlooked, that greater shareholder rights entail 
several important costs.  These costs include such factors as (1) disclosure to competitors of strategic and tactical 
information, (2) slower and less efficient decision-making in a competitive environment, (3) a short-run focus on 
profitability, resulting in reduced capital investment and R&D expenditures (Lehmann, Warning, Weigand, 2002), 
(4) higher career risk and consequently higher CEO compensation (Heffes, 2007 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 
2007), and (5) higher agency costs for creditors in light of potential for frequent management turnover resulting in 
lower credit ratings and higher debt costs (Ashbaugh-Staife, Collins and LaFonde, 2006; Weber, 2006), and (6) 
attempts by the CEO to distort/disguise  proprietary information to protect competitive position. 
 
In contrast to the ―Ideal‖ of corporate governance, an alternative theory of the firm recognizes that the firm 
is a legal entity and management is expected to be the agent of the firm, not exclusively the agent of the 
shareholders.  Consequently, management has responsibilities to several stakeholders—employees, 
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vendors/customers, and society, in addition to the shareholders.  According to this theory, management emphasizes 
long-run value creation of the firm, taking into account the interests of all stakeholders, whereas the shareholders 
tend to focus on short-run financial results (Stout, 2007 and Economist Magazine, 2007).  
 
In view of the costs of greater shareholder rights, and the other countervailing forces, this study advances 
the concept that there is an ―Optimum‖ level of shareholder rights which maximizes the value of the firm.  This 
concept is in contrast to the ―Ideal‖ of greater shareholder rights monotonically increasing the value of the firm.  
This ―Optimum‖ level of shareholder rights is depicted in Figure 1.  As shareholder rights increase from some 
minimum level, the value of the firm is initially enhanced.  But, beyond some efficient level of shareholder rights, 
decision processes and judgment will become constrained, inflexible, and costly.  At this stage, further liberalization 
towards shareholders rights causes the firm to become less responsive to competition and the changing environment 
and loses entrepreneurial effectiveness, thus potentially reducing the value of the firm. 
  
 
Figure I:  Optimum Shareholder Rights and Firm Value 
 
                     Firm Value 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Greater Shareholder Rights 
 
 
SCOPE OF THE PAPER 
 
In light of the theory of ―Optimum‖ level of stockholder rights, this paper investigates empirically the level 
and changes in corporate governance among US firms over the recent past.  Previous research studies have focused 
primarily on cross-sectional performance of corporations associated with selected single or aggregative parameters 
of corporate governance.  These studies also tend to incorporate the assumption that greater shareholders rights are 
continuously desirable, ignoring a possible ―optimum‖ level of shareholder rights.  Thus, alternative theories of 
governance have not been addressed.  The present study focuses on an aggregative measure of corporate 
governance, which incorporates all four standards of greater shareholder rights.  It also focuses on changes in the 
level of corporate governance by industry sector and by size of market capitalization. 
 
The study measures the level of shareholder rights using the G-Index developed by the Investor 
Responsibility and Research Center (IRRC) and available at the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS).  The G-
Index consolidates twenty-four provisions which limit shareholder rights, as described in Appendix A, on about 
1,800 reporting firms.  The G-Index varies from 0 to 24, as each parameter of shareholders rights is given a zero/one 
score.  Zero indicates an absence of that particular limitation on shareholder rights, whereas a ―one‖ indicates the 
presence of that limiting provision.  Therefore, the lower number indicates greater emphasis on shareholder rights 
and a relative absence of management entrenchment provisions.  A higher number indicates the existence of more 
provisions limiting shareholder rights and greater presence of management entrenchment.    The G-index is available 
for the 17-year period 1990 to 2006, with eight census years (1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006).   
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METHODOLOGY 
 
The study analyses the frequency distribution of the G-index scores for (1) the entire IRRC population, (2) 
the S&P 500 companies and (3) the six industry groups comprising the ten sectors in the S&P 500.  (See Table 1.)  
In addition, the study develops and examines basic statistics for each of the eight census years:  the mean, median, 
mode, minimum, maximum and standard deviation.  These data are calculated for the IRRC Population and the S&P 
500 companies (as reported in Tables 2 and 6) respectively. 
 
Secondly, this study, in order to analyze trends, regresses the mean G-Index and the standard deviation 
against time for each of the three classes:  the IRRC Population, the S&P 500 companies and the six industry groups 
as defined in Table 1.  The regression results are set out in Tables 3, 7, 10. 
 
Thirdly, the study examines the frequency distribution of the G-Index by year.  G-index scores are 
classified into three categories, as follows: 
 
 a G-index score between 1-7 is associated with the firms having the highest level of shareholder rights, 
denoted as GSR. 
 a G-index score of between 8 and 10 is associated with firms having mid-range level of shareholder rights 
denoted as MSR. 
 a G-index score of 11 and above categorizes firms with the lowest level of shareholder rights, denoted as 
LSR. 
 
The above classification is based on the observed mean/median/mode range of 8-10.  The median is 
consistently at 9 for all 17 years and for all 1,800 firms in the IRRC population. 
 
Fourthly, this study regresses the GSR, MSR and LSR distributions separately against time to derive the 
respective trend coefficients.  This is done for the IRRC population and the S&P 500 firms, as described in Tables 5 
and 9.  The study also examines the trends over time in the mean G-Index and their standard deviation for the six 
industry groups.  The regression results are reported in Table 10. 
 
RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
1.   IRRC Population 
 
There is a general perception, and it is also suggested in the previous literature, that shareholder rights have 
increased in the last 17 years, due to legislative and regulatory to enhance shareholder rights and increase 
transparency.  However, the results in this study do not bear this out.  With respect to the IRRC Population G-index 
(Tables 2 and 3) the mean, median and mode have not changed statistically between 1990 and 2006. In addition, the 
median G-score has been the same every year pre- and post-2000. Thus, there does not seem to be any over-all 
increase in shareholder rights during 1990-2006 despite legislative and regulatory efforts at reform towards greater 
shareholder rights. 
 
Secondly, the standard deviation of the G-index series for the 1,800 companies has declined over time, 
suggesting that there has been convergence of shareholder rights to a norm that, as noted above, has not changed 
over the 17-year period.  As demonstrated in Figure 2, the standard deviation has declined over time and the decline 
is statistically very significant. (See Table 3.) 
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Figure 2:  Trend Analysis of Standard Deviation  in the G-Index of the IRRC Population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The study investigates the convergence evidence further by examining the tails of the G-Index distribution. 
This analysis finds that: 
 
 the proportion of firms in the Median Shareholder Rights (MSR) category statistically has increased 
significantly (Tables 4 and 5). 
 the proportion of firms with GSR has not changed statistically over time. 
 the proportion of firms in the Lesser Shareholder Rights (LSR) category statistically has declined 
significantly. 
 
These three results buttress the finding of convergence to a standard/norm in shareholder rights that has not 
changed over the 17-year period. 
 
2.   The S&P 500 Companies 
 
The companies making up the S&P 500 are primarily large, broadly held firms that incorporate 75% of the 
total US market valuation.  Statistical analysis reveals that: 
 
 the Mean G-Index for the S&P 500 has increased significantly, which is in contrast to the finding of ―no 
change‖ for the entire IRRC population 
 the standard deviation has declined significantly, again suggesting convergence to a norm of shareholder 
rights. 
 the proportion of firms in the MSR category has increased significantly. 
 the proportion of firms in the GSR category has declined significantly over time. 
 there is no significant change in the proportion of firms in the LSR. 
 therefore, the source of convergence to the mid-range norm is due to a relative decline of firms in the GSR 
category 
 
Taken together, these results depict the following: 
 
 overall, shareholder rights have declined amongst the S&P 500 firms. 
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 a large proportion of firms has moved away from the GSR category to conform to the norm of lower 
shareholder rights. 
 there has been a significant increase in the proportion of firms in the LSR shareholder rights category since 
2000.  The average percentage of firms in the LSR category since 2000 has doubled over the prior period.  
(See Table 8) 
 non-S&P 500, smaller firms have become more shareholder friendly, whereas the S&P 500 firms have 
become much more managerially entrenched. 
 
3.   Analysis By Industry Groups 
 
An analysis of the data for the six industry groups (See Table 10) highlights the following: 
 
 the mean G-index has gone up significantly in Financials, High-Tech and Utilities, meaning that there has 
been a lessening of shareholder rights in these industries. 
 the standard deviation of the G-Index has declined in five sectors over the 17-year period, again suggesting 
strong convergence to the norm for these sectors. 
 In high-tech and utilities there has been convergence to a norm of reduced shareholder rights. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
The paper postulates that there is an optimum level of shareholder rights and  investigates the long-run 
trends in corporate governance and the degree of protection of shareholder rights over the 17-year period 1990 – 
2006, using the G-Index for the IRRC population, the S&P 500 firms, and various industry groups.  The results are 
surprising and contrary to generally held views:  The median G-Index for the IRRC Population (1,800 companies) 
has not changed, but there has been strong convergence towards an average-norm, a one size fits all category of 
shareholder rights. 
 
For large-cap, S&P 500 firms, the median G-Index has gone up, suggesting a limiting of shareholder rights 
among these large firms.  In addition, there has been convergence among these firms to a norm of lesser shareholder 
rights.  Therefore, one can infer that more non-S&P 500, smaller firms have moved towards more transparency and 
greater shareholder rights, in contrast to the large S&P 500 firms. 
 
In general, the industry sectors have also demonstrated convergence to the median-norm of corporate 
governance.  The Financials, High-Tech and Utilities sectors have demonstrated a considerable lessening of 
shareholder rights.   
 
The observed evidence of convergence to a median/norm suggests a constant search by the firms to attain 
optimality in shareholder rights.  The norm for S&P 500 firms has been toward lesser shareholder rights and greater 
management entrenchment, whereas the norm for the non-S&P 500, smaller firms has been towards greater 
shareholder rights and reduced management entrenchment.  Firms seek to balance the benefits with the increase in 
costs associated with greater shareholder rights. 
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Table 1:  Industry Sectors and Groups 
 
The 10 industry Sectors – S&P 500 Companies Industry Groups – Research Study 
Energy 10  
Materials 15  
Industrials 20 EMI  10  15  20 
Consumer Discretionary 25  
Consumer Staples 30 Consumer  25  30 
Health Care 35 Health Care  35 
Financials 40 Financials  40 
Information Technology 45  
Telecommunication Services 50 High-Tech  45  50 
Utilities 55 Utilities  55 
 
 
Table 2:  Statistics on G-Index by Year -- IRRC Population 
 
 1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Mean 8.89 9.19 9.29 8.77 8.98 9.03 9.03 9.02 
Median 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Mode 10 9 9 10 9 8 8 9 
Min 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 
Max 17 17 17 18 19 18 18 18 
Std. Dev. 2.89 2.88 2.81 2.85 2.69 2.64 2.56 2.52 
 
 
Table 3:  Regression of Mean and Standard Deviation against Time  
of IRRC Population 
 
 
Table 4:  Distribution of G-Index Frequencies (percentages) - IRRC Population 
 
Categories* 1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
GSR:  Class 1-7 33.95 29.67 27.81 35.48 31.69 29.14 27.13 27.53 
MSR:  Class 8-10 36.06 35.95 36.83 35.68 38.95 42.29 44.38 44.57 
LSR:   Class 11- 29.99 34.38 35.36 28.84 29.36 28.56 28.49 27.90 
 
*GSR denotes Greater Shareholder Rights--it includes companies whose G-Index is less than 8; MSR is the mid-range 
shareholder rights category and includes companies whose G-Index is 8 through 10; LSR consists of companies with the least 
shareholder rights and is made up of companies whose G-Index is 11 and above.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Intercept Time R-squared 
Regression of Mean 9.05 
(66.56) 
-0.0043 
(-0.16) 
0.065 
 
Regression of Standard 
Deviation 
2.99 
(91.33) 
-0.06 
(-8.99) 
0.97 
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Table 5:  Regression of G-Index Proportions for Three Categories against Time - IRRC Population  
 
 
 
Table 6:  Basic Statistics of G-Index - S&P 500 Companies  
 
 1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
Mean 9.36 9.31 9.40 9.33 9.39 9.66 9.60 9.48 
Median 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 9 
Mode 9 11 11 9 11 11 9 9 
Min 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Max 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Std. Dev. 2.84 2.90 2.87 2.74 2.65 257 2.47 2.48 
 
 
Table 7:  Regression of Mean and Standard Deviation of G-Index against Time S&P 500 Companies  
 
 Intercept Time R-squared 
Regression of Mean 9.27 
(100.24) 
0.038 
(2.53) 
0.72 
 
Regression of Standard 
Deviation 
2.99 
(70.61) 
-0.07 
(-8.09) 
0.96 
 
 
Table 8:  Distribution of G-Index (Proportions) for Three Categories S&P 500 Companies 
 
Categories 1990 1993 1995 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 
GSR:  Class 1-7 50.00 47.37 36.84 30.77 23.08 23.33 19.35 22.58 
MSR:  Class 8-10 35.00 36.84 42.11 57.69 46.15 36.67 48.39 51.61 
LSR:   Class 11- 15.00 15.79 21.05 11.54 30.77 40.00 32.26 25.81 
 
 
Table 9:  Regression of G-Index for Three Categories against Time S&P 500 Companies 
 
Categories Intercept Time R-squared 
GSR:  Class  1-7 30.32 
(19.34) 
-1.24 
(-3.98) 
0.85 
 
MSR: Class  8-10 31.11 
(19.92) 
1.59 
(5.14) 
0.90 
LSR:   Class  11- 38.57 
(34.90) 
-0.35 
(-1.60) 
0.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categories Intercept Time R-squared 
GSR:  Class  1-7 33.4 
(15.13) 
-0.68 
(-1.56) 
0.54 
 
MSR: Class  8-10 32.8 
(25.94) 
1.44 
(5.76) 
0.92 
LSR:   Class  11-- 33.79 
(18.47) 
-0.76 
(-2.10) 
0.65 
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Table 10:  Analysis of Six Industry Groups 
 
Industry 
Groups 
Regression of Mean on Time Regression  of Standard 
Deviation 
on Time 
 Intercept Time R-squared Intercept Time R-squared 
EMI 
 
9.90 
(65.14) 
0.05 
(1.74) 
0.58 2.87 
(24.09) 
-0.057 
(-2.42) 
0.70 
Consumer 
 
9.84 
(103.10) 
-0.03 
(-1.44) 
0.51 2.91 
(161.22) 
-0.03 
(-7.00) 
0.94 
Health-care 10.36 
(60.83) 
-0.03 
(-0.97) 
0.34 2.61 
(25.05) 
-0.07 
(-3.50) 
0.82 
Financials 
 
8.17 
(31.83) 
0.24 
(4.74) 
0.89 2.94 
(25.21) 
-0.02 
(-0.66) 
0.26 
High-tech 
 
8.01 
(83.02) 
0.08 
(4.05) 
0.86 3.24 
(27.53) 
-0.16 
(-6.843) 
0.94 
Utilities 
 
7.38 
(32.44) 
0.27 
(6.07) 
0.93 2.49 
(36.96) 
-0.05 
(-3.78) 
0.84 
 
 
APPENDIX A:  24 COMPONENTS OF THE G-INDEX 
 
1. Antigreenmail Prohibits Large shareholder from not seeking control of a company in exchange for right to 
sell stock back at a premium, unless all shareholders offered same opportunity. 
2. Directors Indemnification 
Contract 
Firm is contractually obligated to pay legal expenses and judgments for suits alleging 
misconduct. 
3. No-Secret Ballot Allows management to examine individual proxy cards. 
4. Blank Check Allows Board broad latitude in determining shareholder rights. 
5. Fair Price Limits the rights of shareholders to tender shares. 
6. Pension Parachutes Acquirer cannot use surplus pension funds to finance acquisition. 
7. Business Combination 
Law 
Imposes moratorium on M&A by a large shareholder 
8. Golden Parachutes Lavish severance agreements for senior executives following change in control 
9. Poison Pill Target firm shareholders have right to buy additional shares at a steep discount. 
10. Cash-Out Law Forces acquirer to pay highest recent price to all shareholders. 
11. Limit to amend by-Laws Eliminates or limits the right of shareholders or the Board to amend the by-laws. 
12. Severance Agreements Assures officers of their positions/compensation without reference to changes in control. 
13. Compensation Plans Allows cash out of options or accelerated bonuses in the event of changes in control. 
14. Limit to Amend Charter Eliminates or limits the right of shareholders or the Board to amend the charter. 
15. Silver Parachutes Similar to golden parachutes, but in this case a large number of employees is eligible in the 
event of change in control. 
16. Director Indemnification 
contracts 
Charter and by-laws obligate firm to pay legal expenses and judgments for suits alleging 
misconduct against officers and directors. 
17. Limits to Special 
Meeting 
Eliminates or limits ability of shareholders to call a special meeting of the corporate 
shareholders. 
18. Director Liability Eliminates or limits Directors personal liability for certain acts. 
19. Limits Written Consent Limit ability of management and Board to negotiate M&A to regularly scheduled meeting. 
20. Staggered Board Only part of the Board is elected each year. 
21. Unequal Voting Long-term shareholders are given more vote than recent buyers. 
22. Supermajority Supermajority of voting shareholders required for M&A. 
23. Directors Duties Allows Board to consider other constituencies to reject takeover. 
24. No-Cumulative Voting Limits rights of dissident shareholders.  Reduces number of independent/dissident directors. 
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